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Summary 
 
Over the past (at least) 15 years, two clusters of developments have been identified as 
challenges to the actual power of the sovereign nation-state as well as to relatively simple and 
easy models of the state assumed in political science and political philosophy. Analyses of 
and answers to these developments, internationalization (including e.g. globalization) and 
dehierarchization (including e.g. multilevel governance), still presume the continued unity of 
a society underneath increasingly fluid political structures. It is however reasonable to assume 
that changes in the political sphere are in some ways reflections of and in others reflected in 
changes in the social sphere. For these reasons and others, a new conception of the polis is 
suggested, more precisely, a framework for modelling social and political cooperation that 
reflects the historical contingency of the sovereign nation-state. Behind this framework lies a 
different conception of order. In this pluralist rather than traditional understanding of political 
order, the building blocks are individuals and their voluntary and involuntary associations. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary political theorists rarely assume, as Rawls once did, that political theory can 
take the culturally homogeneous society with closed borders as a ‘simple’ reference point, and 
subsequently develop ideal theories which one may expect to be modifiable, with just a few 
technical tricks, to suit the complexities of real existing, far more complicated societies. Yet at 
a more fundamental level the alternative view of society as complex (as offered by e.g. 
multiculturalism, feminism and globalism) shares with the classic ‘simplistic’ view the crucial 
and problematic assumptions that political order as such is natural, that it is desirable, and that 
it does not really need to be justified explicitly. 
 
In this paper, I shall argue that we need to distinguish further between two concepts of 
political order. One is the more or less traditional view illustrated by contemporary (both 
mainstream and critical) political theory but also by the way political scientists tend to 
conceive of the sovereign nation-state. Here, order is hierarchically imposed, top-down, 
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regardless of whether it is justified bottom-up or even independent of actual popular consent. 
Unity or the desire for unity and cooperation are seen as normal, while secession, dissociation 
or autonomy are the phenomena that need to be explained.  
 
While this concept of order may be historically accurate given humanity’s tribal past, it is less 
accurate today than it was 20,000 years ago; moreover, there is reason to believe that it is a 
morally undesirable concept of order. 
 
What I am going to defend is an alternative way of conceptualizing order, polity and society - 
moving away in particular from the sovereign nation-state to a more ecumenical model that 
does justice to the role of individuals as moral agents, and as building blocks, origins and 
sometimes creators of society and polity. The state, the nation and sovereignty are historically 
and philosophically contingent phenomena, and the alliance they form in the shape of the 
sovereign nation-state is even more contingent, a phenomenon that perhaps even exists only 
in the minds and books of social scientists. If reality no longer fits this model, a new one is 
required, and what I offer is a framework for developing such a new model – that is, not a 
model in itself, but a framework for developing one. 
 
On the alternative pluralist view, order is created bottom-up, voluntarily or involuntarily, by 
individuals and their (in)voluntary associations in response to the perceived needs and 
interests of an order’s constituent parts. Here it is synchronization, streamlining, cooperation 
and order that need to be explained and justified. Both concepts will be briefly illustrated by 
alternative readings of the political and constitutional histories of the Netherlands, the USA 
and Indonesia.  
 
One reason to argue for the pluralist view is that it enriches normative political theory, while 
(as already claimed) its alternative is a morally undesirable concept. The pluralist concept far 
better suits other assumptions of multicultural, feminist, social liberal and (obviously) 
libertarian political theory - in general, all heirs of the Enlightenment - than the traditional 
view, which might even be seen as a contradiction of Enlightenment ideas on human 
flourishing. The pluralist view can, however, also contribute to empirical political science, 
where it may help develop an alternative explanation and (motivational) understanding of 
‘failed states’ and - a case I shall discuss more explicitly - the continued wide-spread 
resistance to the new European Treaty which succeeded the failed European Constitution. 
 
 
2. The Traditional State 
 
Political science and political theory make assumptions and of course have to make 
assumptions about the existence and nature of the state and of society.  Those assumptions 
could always count on critique, both within and across disciplines, but today they are under 
heavier fire than ever before. Over the past (at least) 15 years, two clusters of developments 
have been identified as challenges to the actual power of the sovereign nation-state, and 
thereby also as challenges to the viability of the relatively simple and easy models of the state 
used in political science and political philosophy (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Classic sovereign nation-state  
 
State B State A 
 
 
(Source: Wissenburg 2008) Arrows up represent demands, arrows down commands 
 
In ‘mainstream’ liberal Anglo-Saxon political theory, for starters - my own field of expertise-, 
the dominant mode of thinking was, for a long time, the one expounded by John Rawls: we 
simply assume the existence of a closed mono-cultural society and of a sovereign nation-state, 
and then develop and test moral principles, mainly principles of social or distributive justice. 
At the very least, the state operates here as a constant - the question is not what it is, whether 
it is, or whether it should be, but what it should do. Even today, mainstream political theory 
still constructs at least one of the two, state or society, as a kind of ceteris paribus condition 
for the debate on morality in politics. In the philosophical debate on multiculturalism, a 
degree of fragmentation of society is recognized, yet it is assumed that a desire in all parties to 
maintain an overall structure of cooperation, an overarching society, will remain - and the 
state is still presumed to be one and indivisible. In the debate on global justice, between the 
cosmopolitan and what Thomas Nagel calls the political conception of justice, the parties 
disagree on whether peoples or nations form societies, or whether the world population as a 
whole does so or should do so. Yet in either case, the state, be it national or global, is again 
presumed to be sovereign and undivided. 
 
The debate on the state in political science has gone through at least three or four partly 
overlapping phases over the past 20 years. First, after the Fall of the Wall in 1989, particularly 
scholars of International Relations discussed a series of phenomena that I would collectively 
call ‘internationalization’. They include:  
 
(1) cooperation between states, institutionalized in common administrative or executive 
organizations with differing degrees of political autonomy; 
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(2) cooperation through treaties; 
(3) economic, social and cultural globalization and migration 
(4) the application of national law to citizens staying abroad 
(5) the growth of international criminal law 
(6) governance without government  
(7) the European Union 
 
All these phenomena and more constitute an internationalization of cooperative structures, 
and one of the aspects of internationalization discussed was its effect on the power of the 
sovereign nation-state, in other words, the question whether a rift existed or grew between 
legal sovereignty on the one hand, the claim to external non-interference and internal absolute 
power, and on the other actual political sovereignty, the ability to satisfy this claim. 
 
A second and more or less simultaneous debate existed in comparative politics and 
administrative science on what I call dehierarchization, the redefining of central government, 
voluntarily or involuntarily and by itself or by others, as no longer simply the highest source 
of authority and power from which all rules for and all power of lower institutions emanates. 
The state would become, at least occasionally but according to some increasingly, just one of 
the boys: a partner along with other social actors, sometimes perhaps stronger but never 
completely overpowering, and either not having or delegating or renouncing power. Examples 
are: 
 
(1) the recognition by states of the authority of pre-state institutions within their domain (e.g. 
precolonial kingdoms in Africa and Asia, clan-like authorities on the Arabic peninsula) 
(2) border-crossing regional authorities such as Euregions 
(3) depoliticization of power: the state retreats from certain policy areas (misleadingly 
referred to as deregulation - misleadingly since rules, rights and duties do not disappear but 
merely originate in other spheres within society. ) 
(3a) in Muslim countries: the sometimes informal transfer of executive and judicial 
responsibilities from the state to organized religion,  
(3b) in the West, a transfer of power to civil society and, 
(3c) more recently, one of the defining characteristics of Third Way social policy, to the 
private sector (privatization); or 
(3d) the sharing of power with other authorities: multilevel governance 
(4) the separation of nation and state: regional autonomy 
(5) sub-politics (as described by Ulrich Beck 1997), where new political issues tend to be 
dealt with more and more in arenas other than the state, or with the state playing only a minor 
role - and where these issues either never even reach the agenda of the state, or are dealt with 
by others, pre-empting the state 
(6) again, the European Union. 
 
In my vocabulary, dehierarchization and internationalization together constitute political 
pluralization, the emergence of ‘polities’ other than the state, where polity stands for any form 
of social organization (e.g. arenas and institutions) within which (among other things) politics 
takes place. 
 
The third and fourth phase in the development of the agenda of political science seem to occur 
more or less simultaneously again: some political scientists combine, as I do, 
dehierarchization and internationalization and ask what it means for the power of the state, 
others, working on the border of law and legal theory, take political pluralization as the 
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background for a debate on the meaning, viability and possible reformulation of the concept 
of sovereignty (cf. e.g. Ilgen 2003; Prokhovnik 2007; Walker 2003). 
 
Now, two observations can be made about the development of the agendas of political theory 
and empirical political science. First: analyses of and answers to internationalization and 
dehierarchization still presume the continued unity of a society underneath these increasingly 
fluid political structures. Society operates as a ceteris paribus condition. 
 
Secondly, political science and political theory have a problem that goes beyond normality, a 
problem that touches on their identity, on the object of research that defines their self-
understanding. The political science model of the Westphalian sovereign nation-state no 
longer seems to reflect reality, and political theory refers to an apparently non-existent or not 
too really real-existing entity. 
 
We must then accept or at least consider a model of politics and society in which the 
sovereign nation-state is a purely legal fiction, lacking both political and moral sovereignty, 
that is, lacking both the actual power and moral authority to top the hierarchy of commands 
and rules in society. Ours is instead a world in which power is exercised and moral authority 
claimed, with equal force, by multiple actors in addition to the state.  
 
But there is more trouble ahead for the traditional view of state and political order. 
 
 
3. State and Society 
 
Throughout the years, it seems that the unity of society remained a stable point of departure 
for political science and political philosophy, even when dehierarchization or multiculturalism 
were the objects of research. The political superstructure of society may change, it may sever 
parts of society from the whole, adopt portions of other societies or even serve to the needs of 
several societies at once, but the building block remains “society”. Society may not be a 
concept as ideologically coloured as romantic, liberal and racist notions like nation or people 
are, yet as specifically communitarian versions of multiculturalism illustrate, it is still 
sufficiently morally ‘burdened’ to raise the suspicion that it is a political construct and not a 
natural phenomenon. More importantly, its moral and scientific desirability as an assumption 
in most work in the field is unquestioned - but no assumption should ever remain 
unquestioned. 
 
I would like to defend two claims: first, that society itself is fragmenting just as much as the 
state is - and that is assuming undivided societies ever existed; after all, even France is a 
dream, and Iraq a nightmare. Secondly, I claim that there are causal and teleological links 
between political pluralization and social pluralization. 
 
To sustain these claims it is necessary to stipulate that when I talk of an undivided society, I 
have in mind a bordered network of social, repeated, perhaps even relatively permanent 
cooperative relations among individuals forming voluntary and involuntary associations, 
including the network of relations among those associations. When I talk of the polity, I am 
thinking of a part of this network, the sub-network of political cooperative structures and 
associations where the rules and conditions for social cooperation are defined. 
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It is not unreasonable to assume that changes in the political sphere can in some ways be 
reflections of and in others reflect in changes in the non-political social sphere. Change does 
not come out of the blue and it often goes noticed, it sometimes even has effects. One might 
even say that making this assumption is kicking in an open door the size of a small continent. 
But from this it follows that it may also be true that political pluralization reflects on and is a 
reflection of a pluralization of society, that is, that it reflects on and is a reflection of the 
creation of new ‘communities’ or spheres of social interaction.  
 
Society continually wipes out, splits off, gives birth to or adopts cooperative associations and 
clusters of cooperative associations, some more vital than others, and some so vital that we 
sometimes talk of societies splitting up in two - think of Hutus and Tutsis - or of societies 
merging into one - think of the original United States. Where societies split or merge, political 
structures adapt; they sometimes even precede secession or integration. Yet social and 
political pluralization may be concurrent but they are not necessarily congruent - political 
pluralization may go one way, say, away from unity, while counteracting social pluralization 
may go the other. Note that I do not wish to claim that all social pluralization is explained by 
political pluralization or vice versa - both may have other causes. 
 
Let me discuss a few examples. First, there are instances where politics or political 
pluralization follows society, but where changes are non-congruent. A process like this seems 
relatively unlikely to happen in democracies, where politicians are after all slaves to polls, 
elections and the unpredictable preferences of the population. Still, the decision by some 
national governments not to repeat the experiment of putting the European Constitution to the 
vote via a referendum shows that exceptions exist. Other examples of non-congruent 
pluralization processes are the many attempts of the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav 
governments to keep the state or states together, the resistance of both Rumania and Ukraine 
to the reunification of Bessarabia with Moldova, and - again in democracies as well - policies 
aimed at integration, citizenship, language skills and dress codes while Muslim immigrants 
appear to prefer increased segregation. 
 
Secondly, there are instances where politics follows society and the directions of both 
processes are congruent: the disintegration of Belgium comes to mind, but also the creation of 
a common market in Europe in response to demands from producers and traders. 
 
Thirdly, society sometimes follows politics in a congruent way - that at least seems to have 
been one of the aims of the whole process of European unification, and it seems to be the 
practice where consumers respond in their behaviour to the creation of a common market and 
to the introduction of the euro. 
 
Finally, society can follow politics and do so in a non-congruent way. Again, we would 
expect that to be rare in democracies and again, exceptions exist - the rejection of the 
European Constitution by the French and Dutch voters (not to mention others, if polls can be 
trusted) comes to mind, as do responses by some Muslim groups to integration policies. 
 
In other words: just like the sovereign nation-state, the concept of a unified and undivided 
society cannot remain an unquestioned assumption. It may not be true that “there is no such 
thing as society”, as Margaret Thatcher supposedly once said, but it is certainly true that no 
one set of clearly delineated, undivided societies exists. More subtlety is required. 
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4. Pluralist order 
 
One way to start designing more adequate models of political order, society and polity, or 
more precisely social and political cooperation, is bottom-up: we start with the individual in 
relation to other individuals, and move up from their networks through networks of voluntary 
and involuntary associations to the highest level, whatever that level may be. I am using the 
word network deliberately here - I believe this concept, so popular in for instance sociology, 
is still underrated in political science. It is this bottom-up approach that I want to defend here. 
 
A first and second reason to opt for the bottom-up approach have to do with the methodology 
of political science. In so far as it is dominated by American and behavioralist traditions, it 
has a classic bias for explanation rather than interpretation, for erklären statt verstehen. This 
means first of all that individuals tend to be reduced to puppets on abstract economic, social, 
cultural, psychological strings. Yet we are sometimes agents. A behavioralist attitude fails to 
acknowledge this, therefore fails to understand what is really happening in politics. Also, it 
has by implication a bias for in a cultural way conservative, herd-managing political 
ideologies (including Marxism) and is therefore biased against reform- and agent-oriented 
political theories including liberalism. It is, in other words, by no means as politically 
impartial as one would want a good scientific paradigm to be. 
 
A third reason has to do with the dominant mode of thinking in political theory: the liberal 
Rawlsian paradigm, to which I already referred. It is an approach to political morality that 
stresses the importance of the individual as a moral agent, and the importance of values like 
individual liberty and equality among individuals, partly as preconditions for moral agency. I 
do not have the time or space to explain how it is possible that a philosophical paradigm that 
uses terms so typical for liberal political parties and ideologies, has been embraced by 
republicans, social democrats and even communists but oddly enough not by classic liberals - 
I hope you will just take my word for it. It has to do with the fact that this kind of liberalism 
aims to be as impartial as possible, in a way, a methodological rather than political liberalism. 
And it is precisely for that reason that it seems inconsistent for philosophical liberalism to rely 
so heavily on varieties of the old sovereign nation-state and not seek to develop an 
understanding of legitimate social and political institutions built on voluntary or rational 
cooperation among individuals. 
 
Central to the liberal tradition is the debate on the protection of liberal democratic values, 
which must be judged from the perspective of the individual - and then we have to ask: what 
kind of cooperation is possible and legitimate? Instead, the agenda of the majority of political 
theorists theses days, including Rawlsians, is focused on the formulation of reasonable 
agreement under ideal, herrschaftsfreie conditions, and on formulating principles and rules of 
conduct derived from that agreement. The existence of society and state is taken for granted - 
but ultimately all initial assumptions have to be justified as well, and that makes the 
individual and (potentially) individual choices the point of departure: liberal political theorists 
cannot infinitely assume that individual X’s ending up in this or that society or group is an 
amoral given historical fact only, unlike X’s born and bred capacities and disabilities that are 
considered morally relevant. Modern political theory cannot ignore the first question of 
classic contract theory: why should any individual, in his right mind and under conditions of 
free and deliberate choice, opt for the construction of this rather than that particular network 
of individuals and these particular customs, habits, rules, principles, convictions etc., rather 
than others. 
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We could add a fourth reason for a bottom-up reconstruction of the concepts of polity and 
society: continental and particularly post-modern social and political thought, including 
feminism, points to the fragmentation of individual identity. We are gendered, sexual 
creatures with professions, hobbies, convictions, diseases and so on, and in each of these 
activities we are subjects of different discourses, and each of these constructs our identity 
slightly differently, resulting in fragmented individuals. One could argue that this post-
modern condition is merely a fad of rich, well-educated westerners with too much time on 
their hands, but that would not be fair - that would only explain the consciousness of 
fragmentation, not its reality for those who are not conscious of it but do live fragmented 
lives. A better response - I’ll leave it unexamined here - is that despite different roles we can 
create one personality by prioritizing and ordering the value and truth systems of the 
discourses of which we are part.  
 
I do not think we need to accept all of postmodernism’s characteristics, including its nihilistic 
and contradictory attitude towards morality, to accept that some sort of individual 
fragmentation is part of life. And that brings me to a fifth reason to focus on the individual 
first: the place in our lives of civil society and the voluntary and involuntary associations of 
which it is made up.  
 
The British political pluralists of the 1900s to 1920 - Laski, Figgis, Cole and others, who by 
the way also inspired modern thinkers like William Connolly and William Gaston (2005, 
2006) - feared and rejected sovereignty more than anything (cf. Nicholls 1975; Hirst 1989). 
They argued that all that individuals sign up for is the rules of the voluntary associations they 
join, not those of the involuntary association, the sovereign state, that claims they joined it. 
Any moral legitimacy the state enjoys must be derived from the voluntary allegiance of and 
contributions made to the voluntary associations of civil society. In place of the all-powerful 
state, then, pluralists defended a state that at best operated as an arbiter, primus inter pares, 
among the voluntary associations from which individuals could derive their identities and 
through which they could give meaning to their lives. 
 
If we ever want to understand why moral and political legitimacy so often conflict, we have to 
start with a model of society that allows us to perceive individuals and associations as creators 
of legitimacy, not merely as panel members. This implies that, like the British pluralists, we 
understand sovereignty as a legal fiction and stress the independence, power and legitimacy of 
voluntary associations against the Leviathan. I thus concur with William Galston that we 
should reconsider and reject ‘the understanding of politics (…) that tacitly views public 
institutions as plenipotentiary and civil society as a political construction possessing only 
those liberties that the polity chooses to grant and modify or revoke at will’ (Galston 2005: 
23). 
 
 
5. A Pluralist Framework: Metropolis 
 
For the five reasons given above and others, I suggest a new conception of the polis, a new 
model of social and political cooperation reflecting the historical contingency of the sovereign 
nation-state and other types of political order. Elsewhere, I have called this Metropolis 
(Wissenburg 2008). Its building blocks are individuals and their voluntary and involuntary 
associations. If we represent those first, we could get a description of the networks of 
individuals that looks roughly as follows - and I stress that this is just an example (see Figure 
2). 
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On this approach, it is no longer the state that commands directly or through institutions and 
the citizen who requests directly or through associations, a model that makes the individual a 
function of the whole. In Metropolis, ‘state’ and other imaginable political institutions are 
functions of networks, of voluntary and involuntary associations, which in turn are functions 
of individual cooperation. 
 
That does not mean that I would wish to defend the ridiculous idea that every association is 
voluntarily chosen or created ex nihilo. Associations are formed against the background of or 
even out of already existing institutions, and that is - in the real world - only rarely done 
voluntarily. If one wants to interpret Metropolis as a model of social cooperation based on 
free choice, Metropolis can only be interpreted as a constant ‘becoming’ rather than 
something that can be, let alone is already, achieved. 
 
 
Figure 2 Metropolis 
A 
 
(Source: Wissenburg 2008) Fictitious example of the associative links among individuals in the metropolis. On 
the X-axis: nine random individuals. On the y-axis: 15 random voluntary and involuntary associations. Lines 
represent association membership shared by individuals. A represents Greenpeace (part of a cooperative 
superstructure with H); B the Elvis fan club; C a home owners association; D an alumni association; E 
membership of Islam (associated in a cooperative superstructure with F and G); F a Humanist society (associated 
with E and G); G membership of the Roman Catholic Church (associated with E and F); H participation in the 
alterglobalist movement (associated  with A); I a trade union (associated with J); J an employers association 
(associated with I); K the traffic laws of the country of Zenda (associated with O); L being subject to Moroccan 
family law; M the Zenda health insurance scheme (associated with I); N family relations; O being subject to 
Zenda family law (associated with K). 
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Metropolis is not an alternative model but literally a new point of view for developing 
models, including alternatives for the classic state model. It is a framework for modelling, a 
meta-model, not a model itself. Theoretically speaking, and that is purely theoretically 
speaking even on the edge of the age of quantum computers, theoretically then, one would 
first map each individual’s memberships of associations, then map overlaps between 
individuals, then add associations of associations, and on the basis of that map describe the 
more dense clusters of associations and individuals as cooperative social structures or as 
polities, and generalizing on that basis again, formulate models. With a bit of luck, political 
scientists may even, among those clusters, find some that closely resemble states, nations and 
even sovereign units. With even more luck, they’ll find other, new models emerging. 
 
An obvious next question is whether a pluralist conception of order cannot just describe but 
also help explain and perhaps even help to morally assess the long-term persistence of 
institutions including the state – a phenomenon that seems at odds with the constructivist 
individualism of the pluralist view of order. A creative misinterpretation of Jean Bodin’s 
conception of sovereignty may help us out here. Bodin’s Six Livres de la République 
(1583/1961) is, at first sight, the classic illustration of the polis as a republic. Yet a further 
analysis of Bodin’s key concept city (cité) allows a surprising new interpretation based on the 
letter of the text. 
 
There is, for Bodin, diversity within the republic: the cité can consist of several villages and 
towns with shared customs, the republic of several cités and provinces with diverse customs. 
The subjects of a republic may be citizens with rights specific to the city, bourgeois with 
rights specific to a particular class of fortified settlement, simple villagers with villager’s 
rights, or parishioners with parish rights (Bodin 1961: 76). A cité may even consist of a union 
of formerly independent entities – Bodin mentions Bern and Fribourg as two examples of a 
union between three constituent parts, viz., two towns and a university. In other words: a 
republic is a union of cités, each of which may be constituted out of different and overlapping 
cooperative schemes. 
 
With this pseudo-Bodinian understanding of the cité in hand, it is a lot easier to square the 
existence of political superstructures with the pluralist idea that individuals already always co-
exist in voluntary cooperative structures. Like those ‘basic’ cooperative structures, 
superstructures are based on agreements, agreements that may be spontaneous or deliberative, 
culturally or historically evolved or a-historically designed. Like all cooperative enterprises, 
they will last as long as the foundation of the agreement lasts. What distinguishes 
superstructures is that they cover not individuals but cooperative schemes, the members of 
which are not necessarily always the same sets of individuals. In so far as cooperative 
schemes overlap the same individuals (and thereby their interests or reasons for cooperation), 
those individuals have a stake in coordination by means of a superstructure, and the more 
cooperative schemes a superstructure covers, the more it will tend to be stable, even more 
stable than its constituent parts. Other things being equal (those other things being e.g. the 
capacity to actually coordinate more and more forms of social interaction), the more ‘reasons 
for cooperation,’ or in Michael Walzer’s terms, the more social spheres a superstructure 
covers, the more stable it will be. 
 
Individual allegiance to a superstructure is, then, ideally and in an a-historical, justificatory 
context, a matter of a cost-benefit analysis. The costs of a worker’s income tax may be 
outweighed by the advantages that same individual gets as respectively a commuter, human, 
parent and citizen from the roads, hospitals, schools and legal systems taxes help to build. Of 
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course, the term cost-benefit analysis is used very loosely; the factors determining allegiance 
are not simply costs and benefits measured by one single standard; they consist of all the 
different types of reasons on which the different types of cooperation rest, as well as on the 
kind of value attached to each of those reasons. Likewise, the prospect of being ruled by a 
heathen or a fanatic, no matter how beneficial that ruler may be in all other respects, may be 
incompatible with the foundational values on which a community is based; a shared religion, 
a shared ethical conviction, a shared dietary preference even may be a conditio sine qua non 
for cooperation rather than a mere calculable factor. 
 
Note that the possibility of legitimate stable superstructures does not automatically imply the 
inevitability, necessity or even overall advantage of the existence of a state. On the pluralist 
view, cooperative structures and superstructures are justified bottom-up, by and through the 
structures of social cooperation among individuals (see Figure 2 above). Nothing precludes 
that one individual joins multiple superstructures or accepts them as authoritative in one area 
but not another; nor that a set of individuals participating in several but not all cooperative 
structures within that set share the same superstructure(s); nor that a cooperative like a town 
or a university participates in two or more superstructures and recognizes neither as absolute; 
nor, finally, that superstructures will form a state. Individuals participate in cooperatives, cités 
and superstructures, together forming one gigantic metropolis including all but hermits - yet 
the links between cooperatives can be structured differently for each single individual. Both in 
theory and in practice, all of the state’s tasks can be performed by distinct and separate 
agencies: legislation and adjudication can be split, as can the execution of security policy, 
economic policy, health policy etc. There is no intrinsic reason why a state-like superstructure 
could not privatize its army or even its whole civil service; nor why the same institution that 
collects taxes should also spend them, nor why the same agency that collects and disposes of 
household garbage should also support the arts. There is no need even to think of actually 
existing states, let alone societies, as monoliths - to think of them both as multi-dimensional 
interconnected networks would be more accurate. 
 
On the pluralist view then, superstructures are tradeoffs between the separate interests and 
considerations of individuals as well as between those of cooperative schemes made up of 
individuals. Throughout most of history in most places, in so far as they were to any degree 
voluntary, they were built and sustained with the methods of power politics, terror and 
violence; where agreement and not will alone played a role, it was mostly in the form of a 
traditionally shared faith, popularity, myths like blood and soil or tribe/nation and 
xenophobia, or simply the absence of all means and opportunity to critically reflect on life.  
 
In some places though, like modern liberal democratic societies and societies touched by an 
enlightened form of communitarianism, people matter. The inevitable result of cooperative 
schemes, especially of the creation of superstructures, is an uneven distribution of power 
among people and their associations (cf. Beck and Grande 2004), hence uneven starting 
positions in the pursuit of a good life. Differences in intelligence, education, health, economic 
and social capital, and simply available time inhibit participation and adequate representation. 
Ideally, a truly sovereign (i.e., all-coordinating) nation-state can circumvent this problem, but 
only when it is a direct democracy in which all members are at least equally rational, equally 
intelligent and equally well informed. Reality does not offer this option; alternatives for a 
politically pluralized world are needed here. As long as superstructures allow or promote the 
execution of individuals’ plans for a good life, and as long as individuals are presented 
adequately, they will command allegiance, while loss of the fetish polity, loss of one’s herd 
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identity and incommensurability will at worst be minor problems. But how is that possible 
without introducing yet more cooperative structures and rules? 
 
 
6. Historical Illustrations3 
 
If we think of political pluralization not as a development towards a utopian or dystopian 
anarchic goal, but simply as a process of devolution and reinvention of order, in which 
relatively stable superstructures can still unite other cooperative ventures, then we seem to 
move a lot closer to what students of the various forms of political pluralization believe is 
happening in today’s world. To make sense of the multi-faceted character of processes of 
state-transformation, internationalization and dehierarchization, many an author has turned to 
historical comparisons. Some, for instance, have argued that we are entering an era of ‘new 
Medievalism’ (Bull 2002). I would like to offer a different simile. One could argue that the 
present global political system, regional systems like the European Union and even individual 
states themselves show striking resemblances to the Dutch Republic of 1572-1795, famed by 
Locke, Descartes, Bayle and countless others as an example to the world in liberty, equality, 
tolerance and justice.4  
 
Indeed, the history of the Republic and its successors, the Batavian Republic and the 
Kingdom, are almost perfect illustrations of the presence of the two competing and 
contradictory concepts of order, and of the way the dialectic of those same concepts can help 
us understand other political histories as well, such as the process of designing the USA, its 
constitution and those of its member states; or the creation of Indonesia. 
 
The Dutch Republic consisted of seven provinces united by a very limited number of 
institutions such as the Estates General left over after the Provinces seceded from their 
Habsburg overlord (the king of Spain) and an even more limited number of newly designed 
national institutions. Each of the provinces had its own unwritten constitution and its own 
Estates (parliament) with representatives of the nobility and the cities, each of the Estates 
being composed in accordance with provincial law, the members elected in accordance with 
local law; each province had its own legal and tax systems, each its own armies, each its own 
rules for religious tolerance (or absence thereof), each its own system of land ownership and 
definitions of nobility. The same applied to the cities and communities: each its own degree of 
autonomy, each its own rules and definition of citizenship, etc. Over time, some but not all 
provinces or cities shared institutions. The provinces of Utrecht and Holland, for instance, 
shared the same chamber of accounts, and some but not all accepted the same person as 
stadhouder, i.e., commander in chief of the army and acting head of state (read: province)5 - 
or from time to time some or all eliminated the position of stadhouder altogether. 
 
The similarities between the old Dutch Republic and today’s political reality are interesting 
and perhaps even striking, but the reason why I introduced this simile is not the Republic’s 
rise or greatness, but its fall. In 1795, after barely surviving a liberal revolution eight years 
earlier, the highly politically pluralized Dutch system finally collapsed, to be replaced first by 
                                                 
3 The greater part of this section is an abbreviated version of a similar section in Wissenburg (2008). 
4 Being exemplary does not imply perfection. The Republic at least excluded and sometimes oppressed and 
persecuted Jews, Catholics, deviant forms of Protestantism, women, homosexuals, non-whites and so on. 
5 Usually, but not always, the stadhouder was a member of the Orange family, which slowly developed into a 
dynasty; the provinces finally made the position of stadhouder hereditary. For a classic history of the Republic, 
see Israel (1995). 
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a revolutionary liberal, centralized sovereign nation-state, the Batavian Republic, and (after an 
interlude under Napoleonic rule) subsequently by a kind of Ancien Régime restoring old elites 
and institutions within the framework of a centralized monarchy. 
 
The reasons why the Republic and its successor fell may shed some light on the prospects for 
political pluralization today. As usual, the reasons are many, some are less public or obvious 
than others, they are all intertwined, and their relative impact is open to debate. I shall limit 
myself here to those that one finds more or less clearly expressed in the Constitution of the 
Batavian Republic of 1798 (Rosendaal 2005). The most striking feature of this constitution is 
the very first sentence in which ‘the Batavian6 People’ constitute an indivisible state - no talk 
of provincial identities there. This was a response to what the revolutionaries saw as the 
inability of the Provinces to protect and promote the shared Dutch (Batavian) values 
expressed elsewhere in the constitution - enlightenment values like liberty, equality, religious 
tolerance and careers and opportunities open to all. In the years before 1795, the 
revolutionaries (then called Patriots) had already tried to overthrow the ruling coalition that 
consisted of an ever weaker Orange dynasty,7 economically ever less important provincial 
nobles and an increasingly intolerant Protestant clergy. The 1798 constitution banished the 
Oranges and their supporters, abolished aristocratic prerogatives, separated church and state, 
gave equal rights to Catholics, Jews and Protestant dissenters, and even implicitly made room 
for atheists. It also redrew legal borders: the various constitutions of Provinces and cities were 
abolished, provinces and communities themselves replaced by departments and cantons 
operating under one national government. Representatives were now chosen by all tax-paying 
citizens rather than by those whose local position gave them the medieval prerogatives of 
nobles or burghers. 
 
The Batavian revolution is the exact opposite of political pluralization, i.e., political 
standardization and centralization, but it still fits the description of a cooperative venture (in 
this case, cooperatives including superstructures) based on a deliberative overlapping 
consensus and aimed (explicitly) at human emancipation; the liberal values expressed in the 
constitution are easily interpreted as expressing the reflective equilibrium among reasonable 
individuals at the time. As compared to the latter-day Republic, its institutions promised not 
only emancipation of the oppressed and exploited, but also more efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Both the chaotic history of the Batavian Republic, where elites had been restructured but not 
replaced and where they organized counterrevolution upon counterrevolution, and the post-
Napoleonic restoration of 1813, supported by the victors over France, show however that 
power and reason are different things. In the 1814 constitution, the old prerogatives of 
nobility and patrician burghers and the old borders between provinces were restored, a 
Protestant state church was (re-)established and other faiths again excluded from public 
service, general suffrage was abolished and all references to human rights were deleted. Only 
the Batavian centralization of (now monarchical) authority at the level of the nation-state was 
maintained, although the Estates General were split in a House of Lords and a House of 
Commons in 1815. It took almost two centuries of slow but steady reform for the liberal 
                                                 
6 The term refers to a Germanic tribe whose capital forms the heart of the present city of Nijmegen. Since the 
early 17th Century, progressive Dutch historians presented them as the mythical ancestors of all the (Northern) 
Dutch, thus creating an identity above and beyond provincial allegiances. 
7 Though it had strong foreign supporters. Robespierre (2007: 84) aptly described William V, the last 
stadhouder, as ‘not so much the prince of the Batavians as the subject of his wife, and consequently of the Berlin 
court’. 
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values of 1798 to be almost8 restored: since 1983, the Dutch constitution again affirms the 
equality of all and separates church and state. 
 
Unlike the constitution of 1798, the 1814 constitution is a clear case of political pluralization - 
one that, however, does not qualify on the emancipation criterion. It expressed a modus 
vivendi, particularly between old and new elites, rather than an overlapping consensus. Even 
so, the modus vivendi was based more on the relative power of the old elites (backed 
externally by the Vienna Concert partners and internally by Orangists and low church 
Protestants) than on a deliberative agreement on basic values; unlike the liberal 
revolutionaries of 1795, the Orangists did not confuse (constitutional) form and substance 
(i.e., the actual distribution of power). 
 
The corruption and demise of the Dutch Republic and the history of its successors illustrate a 
number of points that have been mentioned before, but perhaps have not been stressed 
sufficiently yet. First and foremost: political pluralization may be a priori legitimate, it is not 
necessarily legitimate. Whether or not political pluralization is commendable depends not just 
on whether it implies an improvement in the administration of cooperative ventures relative to 
the status quo ante, but also on the point of view from which improvement is defined. It 
depends, in other words, on political feasibility on the one hand, on moral superiority on the 
other. Each case of political pluralization will be assessed differently not only in its specific 
context but also depending on the assessor’s specific theory of the good society. Secondly, a 
reorganization undoing political pluralization is, by the same token, not necessarily 
undesirable, though it turns out to be no more of a guarantee for basic human rights or other 
emancipation values than a ‘fuzzy’, politically pluralized constellation. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
If we need alternative conceptions of order, alternatives for the classic models of closed 
societies and sovereign nation-states, as I argued we do (see Section 4), there are of course 
more ways to go about constructing such models. Metropolis is just one of them, but it has 
important advantages over other methods - particularly the most popular one, that of 
amending existing models. 
 
Note that this is also how the model of the sovereign nation-state came into being: it is an 
amended version of something older - the Hobbesian Leviathan, in which the king’s head has 
been replaced by an X or by ‘the government’. Hobbes’ model in turn is a simplified version 
of mediaeval models of the polity as a body politic, a metaphorical body, used by authors like 
John of Salisbury and Christine de Pizan to present prescriptions as if they were conclusions 
from common sense descriptions. If we go back even further, we will probably discover that 
the model of the body politic finds its roots in Aristotle, whose model will seems to be an 
inductively construed generalization of Greek political ideology and self-perception in the 
years before Alexander - a self-perception that was, by the way, remarkably blind to 
phenomena like annexation and colonization. 
 
The problem with amending models to suit a new time is that they rarely question the 
fundamental assumptions behind the original model. New models for the polity derived from 
                                                 
8 The position of the head of state is still hereditary. The one true gain on the 1798 constitution is the explicit 
recognition of the existence of women. 
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the model of a sovereign nation-state will involuntarily but necessarily reify the sovereign 
nation-state, which is a model, not a real-existing thing.  
 
Amending that model means never asking whether society and polity are really hierarchically 
organized or really still or really predominantly hierarchically organized, or whether the 
perception of such relations is not perhaps evolving over time and in particular areas into what 
contract theory once proposed: the leader, the government, parliament as delegates and 
ministers, as servants and creations of their constituencies, perhaps even as unruly slaves. And 
those are questions that should be posed - the polity exists, after all, only in the minds of 
people, and it is not the self-perception of politicians that explains patterns of obedience and 
legitimacy, but the continuity or discontinuity of the rulers’ perceptions of their subjects and 
the people’s perception of their would-be superiors. 
 
Amending the model of the nation state also means never asking how representative the old 
model was in the first place - whereas we should: the sovereign nation-state can neither be 
found in the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia nor in the reality of most countries and 
territories. These are just two of the hidden assumptions behind the old model that simply 
amending it would keep hidden. 
 
The model of the sovereign nation-state is morally, ontologically and epistemologically 
biased, and any heir to the model will be so too. That is not to say, though, that Metropolis, 
and behind it the concept of pluralist order, are in turn totally innocent, totally neutral and 
impartial. The pluralist concept of order does have both political associations and political 
implications - and while associations are relatively unproblematic, implications are not.  
 
Metropolis and the pluralist concept of order were developed to offer more room for an 
adequate understanding of political pluralization, and it does indeed help us to better describe 
and perhaps even understand some of the effects of political pluralization. Those effects could 
not be observed or described in the terms in which they must be described, without 
associating oneself with a roughly liberal or humanist view of life - but association is not the 
same as acceptation, let alone approval. The pluralist concept of order symbolized by 
Metropolis is certainly more in line with non-communitarian, Enlightenment-oriented 
conceptions of the good life and the good or just polity: it highlights the artificiality of order, 
its origins in individual, often conscious and even at times deliberate or strategic action. It 
therefore allows us to observe aspects of the impact of political pluralization that a 
communitarian would not see - but it does not force us to judge them, to cheer or condemn 
them. 
 
As illustrations, I mention three such effects (for details see Wissenburg 2008): a politically 
pluralizing world is a world where individuals can count less on all-embracing systems of 
rules to organize their lives - the result being, at least potentially, incompossibility, loss of 
identity and loss of polity. Incompossibility is the existence of two rules that physically 
exclude one another: I cannot exercise my absolute freedom of movement with you exercising 
your absolute right of property to your car at the same time in the same place. Where, in a 
politically pluralized world, two powers claim authority through such incompossible rules, 
absurdity and sometimes chaos results. Loss of identity for the citizen is the result of 
voluntary or involuntary membership of more than one polity, each claiming allegiance and 
each offering a valuable cooperative surplus. Loss of polity, finally, is the flip side of that 
coin: the inability of the citizen to determine which power is morally entitled to, and 
politically capable of, setting the rules in different spheres of social interaction. 
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At the level of the individual citizen, understanding society and polity bottom-up from a 
pluralist perspective on order helps to bring out what from an Enlightenment perspective 
would be the dark side of these three effects of pluralization. While on the up side, political 
and social pluralization offers room for individual emancipation and for the realization of 
individual moral autonomy, the down side is that emancipation and autonomy depend on the 
willingness of powerful associations and powerful individuals to promote emancipation. A 
more communitarian commitment would lead to a totally different assessment, viz., one of 
political pluralization as disruptive, as fragmenting individual and collective identities. 
 
At the level of systems, the introduction of the pluralist concept of order allows us to 
understand political order (structures and institutions) as the result of a dialectic between the 
two concepts of order, the traditional top-down and the pluralist bottom-up concepts. In 
addition to offering grounds for normative assessments of real existing orders, both 
assessments of a justificatory and of a critical nature, a dialectical view offers workable and 
not immediately unlikely explanations and interpretations of the institutional and political 
structure of societies. We saw this in some detail in the case of the Netherlands, but a similar 
case can be made for other attempts to create order. When we add the pluralist perspective, 
the evolution of the United States is no longer a process of a central government imposing 
itself on pristine territory, but a struggle between defenders of central versus fragmented 
government, rationality and efficiency versus traditional rights and freedoms. Likewise, on a 
pluralist view of order, the creation of ‘new’ (post-colonial) states like Indonesia becomes 
much less of an artificial imposition of order and much more a continuation of an ancient 
conflict between centralizers and traditionalists. And likewise, a pluralist perspective helps to 
highlight an otherwise obscure factor contributing to the continued resistance against the EU 
Constitution (now rechristened as a mere treaty): because of its interpretation of subsidiarity 
as top-down rather than bottom-up. 
 
Understanding order as artifice, the pluralist perspective, helps to see that it is not just 
disorder and secession that need to be explained, but that order and unity are equally 
problematic and at least equally in need of explanation. Its introduction or rather rediscovery 
was long overdue. Understanding the evolution of political systems as a dialectic of 
traditional versus pluralist concepts of order adds a third perspective on order for political 
science and political theory, one that is not just plausible, workable and informative but in 
addition also – it seems – less biased, more balanced and neutral. 
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